PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-NEGLIGENT

MISREPRESENTATION-AN ATTORNEY MAY OWE A NONCLIENT A DuTy OF CARE
WHEN THE ATTORNEY EITHER KNOWS OR SHOULD HAVE REASON

To KNoW

THAT A NONCLIENT WILL RELY ON THE ATToRNEY's

REPRESENTATION-Petrillo

v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 655

A.2d 1354 (1995).
Historically, the concept of privity' acted as a moat surrounding an attorney's island of potential liability for negligent acts. 2 In
I Privity is defined "in its broadest sense" as "mutual or successive relationships to
the same right of property, or such an identification of interest of one person with
another as to represent the same legal right ....
Derivative interest founded on, or
growing out of, contract, connection, or bond of union between parties; mutuality of
interest." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
2 SeeJack I. Samet et al., The Attack on the Citadelof Privity, BRIEF, Winter 1991, at 8,
9 (explaining that without privity, there cannot be a duty owed to a third party; absent
a duty there cannot be a breach and, therefore, no cause of action exists). Privity of
contract-once a prerequisite to all negligence actions-is defined as "[t] hat connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990). The English courts, fearing the potential of
endless liability, established the privity requirement in the mid-19th century.
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (Ex. 1842).
In Winterbottom, a coachman filed a negligence claim against the contracted supplier of mailcoaches after being injured due to the collapse of one such coach. Id. at
402-03. The Court of Exchequer denied recovery because the parties were not in
privity. Id. at 403. Lord Abinger opined that "[ulnless we confine the operation of
such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and
outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." Id. at 405.
These words were subsequently interpreted by courts to mean that absent privity of
contract, no action, in contract or tort, could lie for misperformance of a contract.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

93,

at

668 (5th

ed. 1984). Although commentators have condemned this interpretation as faulty,
from it developed the longstanding rule that a contracting party could not be held
liable to a person absent privity of contract. Id.
Consequently, until recently, it was well-established that a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of an attorney-client relationship to recover for an attorney's negligence. Forest J. Bowman, Lawyer Liability to Non-Clients, 97 DicL- L. REv. 267, 267
(1993). In short, a lawyer owed a duty only to those with whom he was in privity of
contract. Id.; see also Walter Probert & Robert A. Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice: Duty
Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 708, 708 (1980) (explaining that,
until recently, lawyers were insulated from nonclient claims except in cases involving
fraud or collusion); see, e.g., Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1879) (holding,
in the landmark privity case in the United States, that "the obligation of the attorney
is to his client and not to a third party"); Chalpin v. Brennan, 559 P.2d 680, 682 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1977) (commenting that privity is the soundest rule); Mehaffy, Rider,
Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, NA., 892 P.2d 230, 240 (Colo. 1995)
(holding that attorney malpractice claims do not extend to situations where the plaintiff is a nonclient); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99 (111. 1982) (explaining
that privity has long protected attorneys from nonclient suits); Favata v. Rosenberg,
436 N.E.2d 49, 51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (declining to abolish the privity requirement
"because of the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship and the potential
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1879, the United States Supreme Court announced that an attorney's obligation extends only to a client, not to a third party.' Until fairly recently, an attorney's shield from nonclient claims, except
claims of fraud or collusion, was virtually shatterproof.4 Grounded
for conflicts of interest which might arise if such liability were extended to non-clients"); TJD Dissolution Corp. v. Savoie Supply Co., Inc., 460 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that an attorney's liability will not extend to a third-party nonclient for negligent advice, unless the attorney acted maliciously or committed a
fraud); Maneri v. Amodeo, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (determining
that an attorney cannot be held liable to a nonclient where the attorney acted in good
faith); Scholler v. Scholler, 462 N.E.2d 158, 159-60, 163 (Ohio 1984) (ruling that an
attorney is immune from liability to a nonclient if the attorney acted in good faith and
without malice); Metzker v. Slocum, 537 P.2d 74, 76 (Or. 1975) (concluding that the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant lawyer was too tenuous to allow
recovery); Thomas v. Pryor, 847 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tx. Ct. App. 1992) (determining
that the beneficiary of a will is barred from recovery, absent privity, while recognizing
the potential ramifications if the privity rule eroded); Berry v. Dodson, Nunley & Taylor, P.C., 717 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tx. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding the privity rule); Bell v.
Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding the privity requirement in attorney negligence cases while noting the severe ramifications of a more
lenient rule); Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Wis. 1987) (ruling that an attorney will not be held liable to a nonclient, absent privity, unless the
nonclient plaintiff presents affirmative proof of fraud).
3 Savings Bank, 100 U.S. at 200. The landmark case Savings Bank v. Ward involved
a debtor's attorney who negligently performed a title examination and was subsequently sued by the creditor. Id. at 196. Citing Winterbottom v. Wright, the Court proffered that "[tihe only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter
into the contract; if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not
go fifty." Id. at 203 (citing Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842)).
It is important to note, however, that the dissent in Savings Bank argued that a lawyer
should be held liable to a nonclient when he knows or should know that his certificate
of title will be relied upon by that third person. Id. at 207 (Waite, J., dissenting).
Although Savings Bank is considered the seminal case establishing the American
rule of privity, earlier opinions refused recovery to nonclients because of the absence
of privity. See generally Seiver v. Holliday, 2 Ark. 512 (1841); Mardis' Administrators v.
Shakelford, 6 Ala. 433 (1844). But cf Lawall v. Groman, 37 A. 98, 99 (Pa. 1897)
(holding that the lawyer for a borrower had a duty to a lender when undertaking the
production of a title abstract under both tort and contract theory). See also Flaherty v.
Weinburg, 492 A.2d 618, 620 (Md. 1985) (noting that a majority of courts continue to
adhere to the view that absent collusion, fraud, or privity of contract, a lawyer is not
liable to a nonclient for professional malpractice).
4 See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Attorneys' Liability to Third Personsfor Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND & WATER L. REv. 379, 380-400 (1967) (discussing the privity rule as
applied to lawyers); Bowman, supra note 2, at 98-99 (discussing an attorney's duty to
nonclients); Douglas A. Cifu, ExpandingLegal Malpractice to Nonclient Third Parties-At
What Cost, 23 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 3-8 (1989) (discussing "the rise and fall of
privity"); Donald B. Hilliker, Attorney Liability to Third Parties: A Look to the Future, 36
DEPAuL L. REv. 41, 43 (1986) (explaining that liability to third parties is historically
rooted in the theory of privity); Nancy Lewis, Lawyer's Liability to Third Parties: The
Ideology of Advocacy Reframed, 66 OR.L. REv. 801, 804 (1987) (discussing the historical
evolution of privity as applied to attorneys); W. Page Keeton, ProfessionalMalpractice,
17 WASHBuRN L.J. 445, 448 (1978) (noting that absent privity of contract, a nonclient
could only recover for harm caused by an attorney's misrepresentation "if the repre-
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in fears of unlimited liability along with the potential for a conflict
of interests, the well-settled rule of law stated that lawyers did not
owe a duty to parties with whom they were not in privity of
contract.5
Affected by the demise of the privity doctrine 6 outside the
sentation was made with knowledge of its falsity or recklessly"); Gary Lawson &
Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professionals: Third-Party Liability of Accountants and
Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation,52 OHIO ST. LJ. 1309, 1309 (1991) (commenting on the expansion of a professional's duties); Matthew T. Byers, Note, Attorneys Are
Not Liable to Their Clients'Adversaries: Garcia v. Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb,
PA., 20 N.M. L. REv. 737, 740-41 (1990) (noting that a plaintiff no longer need be in
privity of contract to establish a duty); Melinda R. Katz, Survey, Privity Requirementfor
Attorney Liability to Nonclients, 4 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 321, 321 (1989) (explaining that, until recently, attorneys were protected by the doctrine of privity from
third-party claims).
5 Bowman, supra note 2, at 97; Probert & Hendricks, supra note 2, at 708; see supra
note 3 and infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text (discussing Savings Bank v. Ward);
see also Chaplin, 559 P.2d at 682 (averring that dissolution of the privity rule may encourage parties to forego legal representation, relying on the fact that they may sue
opposing counsel for legal malpractice if an agreement proves unfavorable); Mehaffy,
892 P.2d at 240 (holding that an attorney malpractice claim is limited to those in
privity because an attorney owes a duty "to his client to employ that degree of knowledge, skill, and judgment ordinarily possessed by members of the legal profession in
carrying out the services for his client"); Favata,436 N.E.2d at 51 (refusing to extend
liability to a nonclient because of the probable conflict of interest that may arise and
"the personal nature of the attorney-client relationship"); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512
N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987) (proclaiming that an attorney must be afforded some
degree of immunity from third-party claims in order for the attorney to represent a
client, because without such protection an attorney "might well be reluctant to offer
proper representation to his client in fear of some third party action"); Green Spring
Farms, 401 N.W.2d at 826 (maintaining that if an attorney is deemed to owe a duty to a
third party as well as to his or her client, then the attorney's ethical obligation to
zealously represent his or her client will be impaired).
6 Hilliker, supra note 4, at 44. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., for example, the
citadel of privity proved penetrable in a negligence action for bodily injury. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916). The plaintiff in MacPherson
sued the manufacturer of a car, which he had purchased from a retail dealer, for
harm caused by the car's defective wheel. Id. at 1051. The MacPhersoncourt, severely
weakening the privity defense, decided that the manufacturer of an inherently or
imminently dangerous product, such as the defendant in the case at bar, owed a duty
of care to third parties. Id. at 1053. For further discussion of MacPherson, see infra
notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing the boundaries of the court's holding
and the court's rational for expanding the notion of duty beyond the confines of
privity); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, §96, at 682-83 (explaining that although
MacPherson purported to only create an exception to the privity rule, the exception
actually swallowed the rule); infra notes 65-70 (examining Thomas v. Winchester, the
decision that prompted subsequent courts to eliminate the privity requirement in
products liability cases).
In the years following the MacPhersondecision, the court's holding was expanded
to create strict liability for harm caused by food and drink products and eventually for
any products designed for intimate bodily use. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791-92 (1966); see Patargias v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, Inc., 74 N.E.2d 162, 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947) (hold-
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realm of professional malpractice, current authority demonstrates
an expansion of duties owed to third-party nonclients by attorneys.7
ing that in cases where harm is caused by either food or drink in a sealed container
sold for human consumption, "public policy demands that an implied warranty be
imposed upon the manufacturer thereof that such article is wholesome and fit for
use, that said warranty runs with the sale of the article for the benefit of the consumer
thereof').
The complete fall of the citadel of privity, however, did not occur until almost 45
years after MacPhersonin the seminal case Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. Prosser,
supra, at 791; see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960). In Henningsen, Chrysler Corp. manufactured a car which was sold by Bloomfield Motors to Henningsen. Henningsen, 32 NJ. at 364, 161 A.2d at 73. While Henningsen's wife was driving the car, the steering malfunctioned and, as a result, she
drove into a wall and suffered physical injuries. Id. at 369, 161 A.2d at 75. Mrs. Henningsen sued both Bloomfield and Chrysler. Id. at 364, 161 A.2d at 73. The court
espoused that a manufacturer's obligation should not rest with privity of contract but,
rather, should be based upon social justice. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 83. Accordingly,
the court imposed liability under a theory of implied warranty of fitness. Id.
The Henningsen court stated that when a manufacturer voluntarily puts an automobile into the stream of commerce and promotes its purchase, there arises an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToaRTs § 402A (1965) (creating strict liability for all defective products
that cause physical harm to their ultimate consumers); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962) (holding that the defendant manufacturer
of a defective power tool was strictly liable in tort); KEETON ET AL., supranote 2, § 98,
at 694 (noting that a claimant seeking damages against a merchant seller now has
available the following three alternative theories of recovery- (1) negligence in tort;
(2) strict liability in tort; and (3) strict liability for breach of either express or implied
warranty).
Glanzer v. Shepard was the first significant case to extend liability, irrespective of
privity of contract, for intangible economic damages. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E.2d
275, 276 (N.Y. 1922); see Richard L. Miller, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence
and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 588, 591 (1972); see also infra notes 77-84
(discussing Glanzer in detail). Also of significance is Rozny v. Marnu4 in which the
Illinois Supreme Court became the first state supreme court to allow a third party
unknown to the defendant to recover for harm caused by a defendant's negligent
misrepresentation. Miller, supra,at 594; see also Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656, 660,
663 (11. 1969). The Rozny court stated:
we emphasize that lack of direct contractual relationship between the
parties is not a defense in a tort action in this jurisdiction. Thus, tort
liability will henceforth be measured by the scope of the duty owed
rather than the artificial concepts of privity.
Rozny, 250 N.E.2d at 660. It is important to note, however, that the court's decision
fell within the boundaries of the tentative Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552.
Miller, supra, at 595; see infra note 130 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 552); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 107, at 747 (stating that liability for negligent
misrepresentation has not been extended significantly beyond section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and, as such, foreseeability of harm is not the rule of
law).
7 See, e.g., Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (en banc) (becoming the
first state to depart from the strict privity rule in a professional negligence case, creating a "balancing of factors" test); see also infra note 99 (discussing the Biakanjabalancing of factors test). Three years after the Biakanja decision, the California Supreme
Court applied its balancing of factors test to an attorney malpractice case in Lucas v.
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Harm. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962); see infra note 106 (discussing the Lucas decision and its slight alteration of the
Biakanjabalancing test).
It is important to note, however, that subsequent California decisions have construed Biakanja narrowly. Lewis, supra note 4, at 805. In applying the Biakanja test,
California courts have been reluctant to impose liability where a plaintiff was not an
intended beneficiary. Cifu, supranote 4, at 9; see also Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d
737, 743 (Cal. 1976) (holding that nonclient plaintiffs could not recover from a defendant attorney because they were not intended beneficiaries).
A number of other courts have applied the balancing of factors test in suits
brought by nonclients. See, e.g., Rathblott v. Levin, 697 F. Supp. 817, 819-21 (D.N.J.
1988) (ruling that where an attorney's negligence in drafting a will deprived a beneficiary of an estate's assets, the attorney may be liable to a nonclient under a simplified
version of the Biakanja balancing test); Marker v. Greenberg, 313 N.W.2d 4, 5-6
(Minn. 1981) (granting summary judgment in favor of a defendant attorney under
the Lucas v. Hamm modified balancing test); Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900 S.W.2d 624, 628 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (holding that the question of
whether an attorney owes a nonclient a legal duty is determined by weighing the
factors under a modified Biakanja balancing test); R.J. Longo Constr. Co. v. Schragger, 218 N.J. Super. 206, 209-10, 527 A.2d 480, 481-82 (App. Div. 1987) (holding an
attorney liable to a nonclient municipality for his negligence in failing to obtain easement rights under a simplified balancing of factors test); Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J.
Super. 581, 593-94, 362 A.2d 581, 588-89 (App. Div.) (applying the Biakanja balancing
test and allowing a nonclient to recover from a defendant attorney), certif denied 72
N.J. 459, 371 A.2d 63 (1976).
Other courts have allowed third-party nonclients to recover under an intendedbeneficiary theory. Bowman, supra note 2, at 275. For example, in Guy v. Liederbach,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that section 302 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts should be applied to determine liability where a beneficiary of a will lost
her intended legacy as a result of a defendant attorney's negligence. Guy v.
Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983). The Guy court proffered that "the grant of
standing to a narrow class of third party beneficiaries seems 'appropriate' under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 where the intent to benefit is clear and the
promisee (testator) is unable to enforce the contract." Id. at 747. Section 302 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines an intended beneficiary as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a
right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate
the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the
beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (1965). Other cases have allowed liability, irrespective of privity, under an intended beneficiary theory. See, e.g., Stowe v.
Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 83 (Conn. 1981) (holding that a nonclient who was an intended
third-party beneficiary of a will could recover damages caused by an attorney's negligence); Needham v. Hamilton, 459 A.2d 1060, 1062-63 (D.C. 1983) (holding that
where a nonclient is an intended beneficiary of a will, the requirement of privity will
not bar recovery); Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So.
2d 1378, 1379-80 (Fla. 1993) (stating that in order to sue for malpractice, a plaintiff
must be in privity of contract with the attorney or, alternatively, must be an intended
third-party beneficiary); Kirby v. Chester, 331 S.E.2d 915, 919, 920 (Ga. Ct. App.
1985) (ruling that an attorney owed a legal duty to a nonclient because the nonclient
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Attorney liability, once partially defined by the concept of privity, is
now in a state of transition that has fostered concern throughout
the legal profession.8 It seems clear that the privity requirement
has been severely eroded; as one court noted, "the present state of
the law governing attorney liability to non-clients is far from
settled."

In a recent decision, Petrillo v. Bachenberg,'° the New Jersey
Supreme Court considered, for the first time, whether an attorney-specifically, an attorney for the seller of a piece of real estate-owes a duty to a nonclient. 11 While acknowledging the
common law privity doctrine, the court joined a growing number
of states that have either abandoned or relaxed the requirement of
12

privity.

The court, in a fragmented decision, 3 joined the minority of
was the intended third-party beneficiary of a tide certification); Pelham v.
Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 100 (I.1982) (concluding that a nonclient may bring a
negligence action against an attorney where the intent or primary purpose of the
attorney-client relationship was to influence or benefit the third party); Flaherty v.
Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 625 (Md. 1985) (recognizing the third-party beneficiary theory as the sole exception to the privity rule).
8 Cifu, supra note 4, at 1-3; see also Richard Amster, Privity Test Replaced in ThirdParty Reliance Cases, N.J.L.J., May 1, 1995, at 11 (stating that the recent decision of
Petrillo v. Bachenberg may have led to a sudden and substantial increase in attorney
liability); Stephen Gillers, Ethics that Bite: Lawyers'Liability to Third Parties,LrrIGATION,
Winter 1987, at 8 (explaining that today there are cracks in the citadel of privity that
"[1] ike geological faults, they are shifting and unpredictable"); Lawson & Mattison,
supra note 4, at 1309-10 (noting that the sudden growth of third-party liability suits for
professional negligence has created serious questions for professionals concerning
their ethical and legal obligations to nonclients); DAVIDJ. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRA CE: LAw AND PROCEDURE § 6:1, at 93 (1980) (pointing out that the most potentially volatile development in the area of legal malpractice is the expansion of duties
attorneys owe to nonclients).
9 F/aherty, 492 A.2d at 622.
10 139 NJ. 472, 655 A.2d 1354 (1995).
11 Id. at 479, 655 A.2d at 1357. The New Jersey Supreme Court had previously
held that an attorney owes a fiduciary obligation to all persons, even nonclients,
under particular circumstances. See In re Palmieri, 76 N.J. 51, 59, 385 A.2d 856, 860
(1978) (stating that attorneys owe fiduciary duties to nonclients who the lawyer knows
or should know will depend on that attorney's advice); In re Hurd, 69 N.J. 316, 330,
354 A.2d 78, 85-86 (1976) (same); In re Genser, 15 NJ. 600, 606, 105 A.2d 829, 832
(1954) (same).
12 Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 480, 655 A.2d at 1358.
13 Id. at 498, 655 A.2d at 1367. Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Handler,
O'Hern, and Stein joined Justice Pollock to comprise a majority that affirmed and
remanded the appellate division's judgment. Id. at 475-89, 498, 655 A.2d at 1355-62,
1367. Justice Stein, concurring, wrote separately to stress his view that the majority's
holding does not materially affect the liability of lawyers to nonclients. Id. at 489-90,
655 A.2d at 1362-63 (Stein, J., concurring). Justice Garibaldi, dissenting, expressed
her view that the court's broad definition of an attorney's duty to a third party will
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states that hold attorneys liable for all foreseeable harms to nonclients.1 4 Consequently, the majority determined that under the
facts presented, the seller's attorney owed a duty to the potential
buyer. t5 The court held that a seller's attorney is liable for the negligent misrepresentation of information which he either knew or
should have known would be relied upon by a third party.1 6 The
supreme court espoused that such a duty rightfully protects inculpable third parties who rely on an attorney's negligent misrepre17
sentation to their financial detriment.
In 1987, defendant Bruce Herrigel, attorney for the seller, represented Rohrer Construction (Rohrer) in the sale of a 1.3-acre
tract of undeveloped land.1 8 Rohrer hired an engineering company to conduct percolation tests 9 in preparation for a possible
contract for the sale of the land. 0 The engineering firm provided
both Herrigel and Rohrer with copies of reports that described two
series of percolation tests.2 1 The first report showed that one out
of the twenty-two tests had been successful, while the second report
demonstrated that one out of eight tests was successful.2 2
lead to defensive lawyering and other related problems. Id. at 490, 655 A.2d at 1363
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 483, 655 A.2d at 1359. The court specifically stated that "attorneys may
owe a duty of care to non-clients when the attorneys know, or should know, that the
non-clients will rely on the attorney's representations and that the non-clients are not
too remote from the attorneys to be entitled to protection." Id. at 483-84, 655 A.2d
1359-60.
15 Id. at 487, 655 A.2d at 1361-62. The majority noted that the decision to reverse
the trial court's judgment for dismissal does not necessarily mean that a jury would
ultimately rule against the seller's attorney. Id. at 488, 655 A.2d at 1362. The court
stressed that the decision only guarantees that a jury will have an opportunity to determine the effect that the attorney's negligent misrepresentation had on the buyer. Id.
16 Id. at 483-84, 655 A.2d at 1360. Justice Pollock proffered that a nonclient must
not be "too remote" from an attorney to be allowed recovery. Id. The majority maintained that the standard applied by the court does not impose on lawyers the duty of
guarantors of surveys and other reports that they merely transmit. Id. at 489, 655 A.2d
at 1362. Justice Pollock explained that the court's holding simply provides that the
seller's attorney had a duty to accurately represent materials which he knew or should
have known would be relied upon. Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 474, 655 A.2d at 1355. The tract of land is located in Union Township,
Hunterdon County. Id.
19 Id. The percolation tests were intended to reveal "the suitability of soil for a
septic system." Id. at 475, 655 A.2d at 1355. The engineering company hired by Rohrer was Heritage Consulting Engineers. Id. at 474, 655 A.2d at 1355.
20 Id. at 474-75, 655 A.2d at 1355. Union Township would approve the construction of a septic system only upon the successful completion of two percolation tests.
Id. at 475, 655 A.2d at 1355.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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Subsequently, the contract for the sale of the land fell through
and Rohrer listed the property with Bachenberg & Bachenberg,
Inc., a real estate broker. 23 Soon thereafter, William Bachenberg
requested information from Herrigel concerning the property.2 4
In response to this inquiry, Herrigel sent Bachenberg a two-page
document that was essentially one page from each of the two engineering reports. 25 The first page was garnered from the first re26
port and reflected five unsuccessful tests and one successful test.
The latter page, which was taken from the second series of tests,
reflected one successful and only one unsuccessful test.27 Ultimately, the documents Herrigel provided, which became known as
the "composite report," were included in Bachenberg's sales
28
packet.
In December 1988, Bachenberg bought the property at a sheriff's auction' and listed it for sale. ° The plaintiff, Lisa Petrillo,
first expressed an interest in buying the property in February of
1989, whereupon Bachenberg gave Petrillo a sales packet that contained the composite report of the 1987 percolation tests.3 1 Subsequently, in June 1987, Petrillo and Bachenberg engaged in
contract negotiations for the sale of the land.3 2 Herrigel represented Bachenberg throughout the negotiations. 33 The parties
agreed that Petrillo had forty-five days to conduct her own percolaId.
Id.
25 Id. Herrigel told Bachenberg that "he had some perc results." Id. The supreme
court noted that Herrigel admitted that he had in his possession complete documentation of the 1987 percolation reports and that he instead provided Bachenberg with
a composite report. Id. The court further commented that even though Herrigel did
not deny that he prepared the report, his petition for certification asserted that the
plaintiffs had not actually proven that he prepared the misleading composite report.
Id.
26 Id. at 475, 655 A.2d at 1355.
27 Id. The court pointed out that the two-page document portrayed what appeared to be two successful percolation tests out of a single series of seven tests. Id.
In reality, however, the property's soil had passed merely two out of 30 tests. Id.
23
24

28 Id.
29 Id. Rohrer could not sell the property and was evidently experiencing financial

problems. Id. Consequently, Bachenberg, together with a partner named John Matthews, was able to buy the property for $70,000 at a sheriff's sale. Id. at 475-76, 655
A.2d at 1355. In January of 1989, Bachenberg and Rohrer discussed the 1987 engineering reports. Id. at 476, 655 A.2d at 1355. Rohrer, however, would not deliver the
reports to Bachenberg because Bachenberg refused to reimburse Rohrer for the engineering fees expended in conducting the tests. Id.
30 Id., 655 A.2d at 1356. The property was listed for sale at $160,000. Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. Petrillo had agreed to pay Bachenberg's asking price. Id.
33 Id.
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non tests.3 4 If, upon completion, Petrillo was not satisfied with the
35
results, then she could rescind her offer to purchase the land.
In August of 1989, Petrillo retained Canger & Cassera, an engineering firm, to conduct site planning and soil tests.3 6 Canger &
Cassera recommended that it start site planning work immediately
and subcontract the needed percolation tests to another firm so
that both projects could be performed simultaneously.3 7 The subcontracted engineering firm, PMK, Ferris & Perricone (PMK), performed six percolation tests, all of which were unsuccessful.38 As a
result, PMK determined that the tract of land was inadequate to
support a septic system.39 On August 22, 1989, Petrillo informed
Bachenberg that she was rescinding her offer to purchase the
land.'
Petrillo filed a suit in the NewJersey Superior Court, Law Division, against Bachenberg, Matthews, and Herrigel for the cost of
her engineering fees and the return of her $16,000 down payment.4 1 Petrillo alleged in part that Herrigel owed a duty to her
and, as such, he was liable for his negligent misrepresentation of
the land's ability to handle a suitable septic system.4 2 Petrillo's
complaint further asserted that Herrigel's failure to provide complete and accurate documentation of the 1987 percolation tests resulted in unnecessary engineering expenses. 3 The trial court, at
the close of Petrillo's case, dismissed the complaint against Herrigel, concluding that Petrillo had failed to support her contention
34 Id. Nothing in the record suggested that Herrigel had informed Petrillo or her
attorney that the composite report was incomplete. Id.

35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. Canger & Cassera based this recominendation on the contents of the composite report. Id.

38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. Specifically, Petrillo informed Bachenberg that "the contract was null and
void." Id. In what appeared to be an attempt to salvage the transaction, Bachenberg
hired Heritage Engineering to design a septic system that would meet the municipality's requirements. Id. Although Bachenberg was able to receive the municipality's
approval for the system, Petrillo rejected the design and requested permission to perform further percolation tests. Id. Bachenberg denied this request. Id. Ultimately,
the parties were unable to settle their differences. Id. at 477, 655 A.2d at 1356.
Bachenberg, claiming that Petrillo had breached their contract, refused to return Petrillo's down payment. Id.
41 Id. Petrillo's complaint included claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
conspiracy, and concealment. Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. Petrillo argued specifically that if she had been aware that the property had
failed all but two of the 30 tests, she neither would have signed the contract nor
contracted with Canger & Cassera and PMK. Id.
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that Herrigel's duty as an attorney extended to her.4 4
The appellate division reversed, holding that Herrigel, as the
seller's attorney, owed a duty to Petrillo, the nonclient buyer.4 5
The court concluded that Petrillo could maintain a cause of action
against Herrigel for his alleged negligence in providing misleading
information concerning the property.46 Relying on prior case law,
which had weakened the common law privity requirement, the appellate court determined that an attorney owes a fiduciary duty to
all persons-even nonclients-who the attorney either knows or
should
know are relying on the attorney in his professional capacity.4 7 The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently granted Herrigel's petition for certification to address whether a seller's
attorney owes a duty to a nonclient potential buyer of real estate.4 8
Justice Pollock, writing for the majority, affirmed the appellate
44 Id. Regarding Petrillo's claim against Herrigel the trial court pronounced:

There are no facts dealing with any responsibility or duty that Mr.
Herrigel had. He had no knowledge of what Mr. Bachenberg gave, if
anything, to Miss Petrillo, and on Miss Petrillo's cross-examination she
essentially said she never intended to rely on anything Mr. Herrigel provided or failed to provide and never hired Mr. Herrigel. Mr. Herrigel
never gave direct information to her. Mr. Herrigel never refused to answer any questions put to him.
Taking the mechanical function that I must apply, I find there is no
evidence that I have before me dealing with any responsibility or any
breach of any duty committed by Mr. Herrigel in this transaction.
Id. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs concealment claims against Bachenberg
and Matthews. Id. The jury, which decided the remaining claims by answer to specific interrogatories, determined that Petrillo could have, based upon PMK's unsuccessful tests, terminated the contract. Id. Thejury found, however, that Petrillo never
terminated the contract and in fact, Petrillo herself had breached the contract by not
pursuing site plan approval after the county had approved Heritage's septic system
design. Id. at 477-78, 655 A.2d at 1356-57. Based on these conclusions, the jury determined that Bachenberg could retain the $16,000 deposit. Id.
45 Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 263 N.J. Super. 472, 487, 623 A.2d 272, 280 (App. Div.
1993), afd, 139 N.J. 472, 655 A.2d 1354 (1995). The appellate division determined
that the trial court erred when it granted Herrigel's involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs
legal malpractice and negligence claims against Herrigel. Id. Consequently, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case, granting a new trial on the issue of
Herrigel's liability. Id. Further, the court reversed the judgment entered against Petrillo because it deemed the jury instructions erroneous. Id. at 481, 623 A.2d at 276.
46 Id. at 487, 623 A.2d at 280.
47 Id. at 483, 623 A.2d at 278. The court relied, in part, on three prior NewJersey
cases: Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 NJ. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
72 N.J. 459, 371 A.2d 63 (1976); Albright v. Bums, 206 N.J. Super. 625, 503 A.2d 386
(App. Div. 1985); and R.J. Longo Constr. Co. v. Schragger, 218 N.J. Super. 206, 527
A.2d 480 (App. Div. 1987). Id. at 484-86, 623 A.2d at 278-79. For a detailed discussion
of Stewart, Albright, and RJ. Longo, see infra note 123.
48 Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 134 N.J. 566, 636 A.2d 523 (1993); see also Petrillo, 139
NJ. at 474, 655 A.2d at 1355 (noting the supreme court's reasons for granting
certification).
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division's holding.4 9 Adopting the general tort standard of reasonable foreseeability, the court articulated that an attorney could be
held liable to a nonclient for the negligent misrepresentation of
information upon which he either knew or should have known a
third party would rely.5 °
The historical debate over privity began in 1842, when an English court first enunciated the privity rule in the seminal case
Winterbottom v. Wright.5 1 In Winterbottom, the defendant manufacturer of a mailcoach contracted with the postmaster general, the
owner of the coach, to maintain the coach in proper working condition.5 2 The plaintiff, a driver of the coach, sued the manufacturer for damages he suffered when the coach unexpectedly
broke. 5 3 The court, although sympathizing with the plaintiff,5 4 determined that absent privity of contract, the defendant could not
be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries.55 Lord Abinger stated that
"[u]nless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous
consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue."56 Subse49 Id. at 488, 655 A.2d at 1362.

50 Id. at 483-84, 655 A.2d at 1359-60. Specifically, the court articulated that Herrigel could be held liable for any information that he negligently misrepresented
which he knew or should have known Petrillo would rely upon to her financial detriment. Id. at 489, 655 A.2d at 1362. The court further determined that, contrary to the
dissent's opinion, a jury could reasonably conclude that Herrigel should have foreseen that Bachenberg would deliver the composite report to prospective purchasers.
Id. at 488, 655 A.2d at 1362.
51 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 403 (Ex. 1842).
52 Id. at 402-03.
53 Id. at 403.
54 Id. at 405-06 (Rolfe, B., concurring). The court noted that "(t]his is one of
those unfortunate cases in which there has been damnum, but it is damnum absque
injuria; it is, no doubt, a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but by
that consideration we ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has been frequently
observed, are apt to introduce bad law." Id.
55 Id. at 404. The court stated that whenever a suit involves a breach of contract,
only a party to the contract may sue. Id. at 405. The court reasoned that absent such
a rule, potential liability of all tortfeasors would be unmanageable. Id. Lord Abinger
stated that:
if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might
bring a similar action.
Id. Lord Alderson concurred, asserting that
[i]f we were to hold that the plaintiff could sue in such a case, there is
no point at which such actions would stop. The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who enter into the contract: if we go
one step beyond that, there is no reason why we should not go fifty.
Id. (Alderson, B., concurring).
56 Id.
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quently, American courts interpreted Lord Abinger's words to
mean that, absent privity, a third party could not maintain an ac57
tion in either contract or tort.
More than thirty years later, in the landmark case Savings Bank
v. Ward,58 the United States Supreme Court applied Winterbottom to
a professional negligence case.5 9 In Savings Bank, the Court confronted the issue of whether a third-party nonclient could recover
from an attorney for negligence in the performance of his professional duties.6 0 Specifically, the Court addressed whether an attorney for a borrower was liable to a creditor, with whom the attorney
had no contract or communication, for his negligent examination
and report of a property title.6" The Court held that in the absence
of collusion, fraud, or privity of contract, a nonclient could not
hold an attorney liable for negligence.6 2 This decision resulted in
the firm entrenchment of attorneys' freedom from liability to third
party nonclients.6" The citadel of privity protecting lawyers from
nonclient suits would remain essentially unchallenged for over
sixty-five years. 64
In 1852, however, a New York court had already chipped away
at the privity defense as applied to manufacturers of defective
products in Thomas v. Winchester.6 5 In Thomas, the court addressed
the issue of whether, absent privity of contract, a plaintiff could
recover from the vendor of an erroneously labeled poisonous
drug.6 6 The plaintiff, in reliance on the false label, had purchased
the poison from a druggist and consequently suffered severe physical injuries.6 7 Although the court averred that it was in no way
57 KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 93, at 668. Following Winterbottom, other courts
held that a manufacturer of a defective product is not liable to those with whom it is
not in privity. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Perkins-Cambell Co., 87 F. 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1898);
Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351, 361 (1870); Curtain v. Somerset, 21 A. 244, 245 (Pa.
1891).
58 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
59 Id. at 197, 203.
60 Id. at 195.
61 Id. at 195-96.
62 Id. at 203.
63 See Averill, supra note 4, at 380 (asserting that "until recently, the rule of nonliability of an attorney to third persons has been immutable").
64 Id. at 387; see Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1961) (retreating from the strict application of the privity requirement).
65 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
66 Id. 405-06. The medicine was labeled dandelion but it was actually belladonna,
a deadly poison. Id. at 405.
67 Id. at 405-06. The court noted that plaintiff Thomas, upon taking what she believed to be dandelion, suffered "coldness of the surface and extremities, feebleness
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loosening the underpinnings of Winterbottom, 68 it determined that
either death or serious physical harm constituted an inevitable consequence of the inaccurately labeled drug.69 Therefore, the court
concluded, the defendant owed a duty to those not in privity and
upon breach the druggist could be held liable.7"
Indicating that concerns regarding endless liability had taken
a backseat to the fear of unjust results, the New York Court of Appeals, in the 1916 case MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,7 determined
that the Thomas v. Winchester rule of law was not limited to situations involving poisons or explosives.7 2 In MacPherson, the court
answered whether, despite the absence of privity between the parties, a car manufacturer was liable for injuries the plaintiff sustained as a result of a defective wheel.7"
Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, held that irrespective
of privity of contract, a manufacturer owes a consumer a duty
whenever it puts a "thing of danger" into the stream of commerce." The justice explained that a "thing of danger" includes
of circulation, spasms of the muscles, giddiness of the head, dilation of the pupils of
the eyes, and derangement of mind." Id. at 405.
68 Id. at 408-09. Chief Justice Ruggles, distinguishing the case at bar from cases
decided under Winterbottom, provided an illustrative example, explaining that:
If, in labeling a poisonous drug with the name of a harmless medicine,
for public market, no duty was violated by the defendant, excepting that
which he owed to Aspinwall, his immediate vendee, in virtue of his contract of sale, this action can not be maintained. If A. build a wagon and
sell it to B., who sells it to C., and C. hires it to D., who in consequence
of the gross negligence of A. in building the wagon is overturned and
injured, D. can not recover damages against A., the builder. A.'s obligation to build the wagon faithfully arises solely out of his contract with B.
The public have nothing to do with it. Misfortune to third persons, not
parties to the contract, would not be a natural and necessary consequence of the builder's negligence; and such negligence is not an act
imminently dangerous to human life.
Id. at 407-08.
69 Id. at 409.
70 Id. at 410. The court explained that defendant's duty was a public duty as opposed to a duty that may arise from a contractual relationship. Id.
71 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
72 Id. at 1053.
73 Id. at 1051.

Buick sold the car to a retail dealer who in turn resold it to the
plaintiff. Id. While the plaintiff was driving, the car suddenly collapsed and he was
thrown out of the car, suffering physical injuries. Id. A defective wheel, which was not
manufactured by the defendant, was found to be the cause of collapse. Id. The court
noted, however, that the evidence indicated that a reasonable inspection would have
led to discovery of the defect. Id.
74 Id. at 1051, 1053. Justice Cardozo elucidated that "[t]here must be knowledge
of a danger, not merely possible, but probable." Id. at 1053. The justice further explained that there must be knowledge that this danger might effect persons other
than the buyer. Id.
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items that are destructive in their normal use, as well as items that
when negligently made are reasonably certain to pose a danger to
life and limb.75 The majority concluded that whenever there is an
awareness that a "thing of danger" will be used without proper testing, then, regardless of privity, the manufacturer owes a duty to
third parties.7 6
Soon thereafter, in Glanzer v. Shepard,7 7 the New York Court of
Appeals expanded the relatively limited holding of MacPherson.7"
In Glanzer, the defendant, a public weigher, was hired by a vendor
to weigh bags of beans which were in turn sold to a vendee. 9 The
defendant erroneously certified the weight of the beans and, consequently, the vendee overpaid the merchant.8" The vendee sued
the public weigher for the sum he overpaid."
Justice Cardozo, writing for a unanimous court, explained that
a person following a common calling may owe a duty to a third
party, even though another party may make payment or give the
order.8 " Accordingly, under principles of tort law,8" the court held
the defendant public weigher liable to the third-party plaintiff because of the party's reliance on the certification. 84
Id.
Id. Having delineated the circumstances in which a manufacturer may be held
liable to a third party, the court held Buick Motor Co., the manufacturer, liable for
the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at 1055. The court maintained that Buick could not be
exonerated from a duty to inspect simply because the wheel was bought from another
manufacturer. Id. In contrast, the court concluded that Buick owed a responsibility
to the public to test all component parts of their automobiles before placing them on
the market. Id.
77 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
78 Id. at 275-76.
79 Id. at 275.
80 Id. The court stressed that the public weigher's negligence involved an action,
not mere words. Id. at 276.
81 Id. at 275.
82 Id. at 276. Justice Cardozo specifically stated that "[o] ne who follows a common
calling may come under a duty to another whom he serves, though a third may give
the order or make the payment." Id. The court also provided several examples to
illustrate situations in which a duty exists in the absence of privity of contract. Id. The
justice explained that a surgeon who negligently sets the broken arm of a child is
responsible for his negligence, despite the fact that the father of the child pays the
bill. Id. Next, Justice Cardozo noted that a bailee of goods does not escape liability
for his careless treatment of the goods simply because the deposit may have been
made by a third party. Id. Finally, the majority proffered that "[iut is ancient learning
that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to
the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." Id.
83 Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 277. The court noted that the defendant's obligation arose
in the context of duty, rather than by contract. Id.
84 Id. The court briefly mentioned cases that dealt with both third-party beneficiary and agency theories that would have aptly served the court's purpose. Id. The
75
76
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Only nine years later, however, the New York Court of Appeals
took a step away from the dissolution of privity in Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche."5 In Ultramares, a creditor who had loaned money to a corporation, relying on an accounting firm's negligent certification of
the corporation's financial condition, brought suit against the accounting firm for its negligent misrepresentation, despite the parties' lack of contractual privity. 6 Severely limiting its holding in
Glanzer, the New York Court of Appeals refused to hold the defendant accountants liable to the plaintiff, determining that in the absence of privity of contract no duty should be imposed. 7
Chief Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, reasoned that
if liability were to exist for a blunder of words, accountants would
be exposed to an indeterminate amount of liability to an unpredictable class of persons.8 8 The majority distinguished Glanzer primarily on the ground that the service performed by the defendant
in Glanzer predominately benefited the third-party plaintiff.8 9 In
the case at bar, explained the justice, the audit was performed for
the client's benefit and thus only incidentally and collaterally affected the third-party plaintiff.9" Finally, the court clarified that its
court stated, however, that "we have preferred to reach the goal more simply." Id.
Specifically, the court announced that:
[t]he defendants, acting, not casually nor as mere servants, but in the
pursuit of an independent calling weighed and certified at the order of
one with the very end and aim of shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was owing, not only to him who ordered, but to him also who
relied.
Id.
85 174 N.E. 441, 447, 448 (N.Y. 1931). From this case stems Chief Justice Cardozo's famous quote: "The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these
days apace." Id. at 445.
86 Id. at 442-43.
87 Id. at 447, 448.
88 Id. at 444. The court, perhaps indicating that it decided the case based upon
fear of negative ramifications to all professions, stated:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many callings other than an auditor's. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to the
validity of municipal or corporate bonds, with knowledge that the opinion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to the
investors, if they have overlooked a statute or a decision, to the same
extent as if the controversy were one between client and advisor. Title
companies insuring titles to a tract of land, with knowledge that at an
approaching auction the fact that they have insured will be stated to the
bidders, will become liable to purchasers who may wish the benefit of a
policy without payment of a premium.
Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448.
89 Id. at 445, 446.
90 Id. at 446. Further, noted the court, the relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant in Glanzer, unlike the plaintiff and defendant in the case at bar, was so
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holding did not shield accountants from all liability. 1 The justice
explained that under the court's holding, accountants may still be
92
held liable for reckless misstatements or false opinions.
Behind this backdrop of expanding liability, the Supreme
Court of California decided Biakanja v. Irvin a in 1958, thus becoming the first court to abandon the privity requirement in a professional negligence case.9 4 In Biakanja, the defendant notary
public, while engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, negligently failed to have a will properly attested. a5 Thus, the sole beneficiary of the will received only one-eighth of the estate through
intestate succession.9 6 Thereafter, the beneficiary sued the notary
public for the damages caused by his negligence. 7
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court of California unanimously
decided to abandon the privity requirement. 9 In its place, the
court created a balancing test.' Under its "balancing of factors"
test, the court held that the plaintiff could recover his losses from
close that it approached actual privity. Id. The court also distinguished the two cases
by explaining that the defendant in Glanzer was well4nformed that the certificate he
rendered was "the end and aim of the transaction," while in the instant case the defendant's certified audit presented only the possibility of future use and reliance
thereon. Id. at 445. The court further elaborated that the instant case involved the
utterance of mere words, while Glanzer involved negligence in the performance of a
service. Id. at 446.
91 Id. at 448.
92 Id. Justice Cardozo maintained, however, that liability for an honest blunder or
negligent misstatement of fact is bound by the law of contracts and, as such, a plaintiff
cannot recover. Id.
93 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
94 See id. at 19 (allowing recovery by the plaintiff despite a lack of privity).
95 Id. at 17. The attorney who represented the plaintiff testified that he had a
telephone conversation with the defendant shortly after the testator's death. Id. According to the plaintiffs attorney, when questioned about the attestation of the will,
the defendant "admonished [him] to the effect that [he] was a young lawyer, [he'd]
better go back and study [his] law books some more, that anybody knew a will which
bore a notarial seal was a valid will, didn't have to be witnessed by any witnesses." Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.

98 Id. at 19.

99 See id. (creating a test that has subsequently been named "the balancing of factors test"). Announcing the balancing of factors test, the court articulated:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves
the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which
the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of
harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing future harm.
Id.; see also Averill, supranote 4, at 393 (remarking that the Biakanjabalancing factors
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the defendant notwithstanding the absence of privity. 100
In the monumental decision Lucas v. Hamm,' 0 1 decided only
three years after Biakanja, the California Supreme Court dismanfled the strict privity requirement as applied to attorneys.1 0 2 In Lucas, the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of a will who, due to
the defendant attorney's alleged negligence in drafting the will,
could not recover $75,000 left to him under a trust by the
testator. 103
Chief Justice Gibson, writing for a unanimous court, proffered
that the lack of privity between the attorney who drew the will and
the beneficiary did not preclude an action in either tort or contract. 10 4 Engaging in a tort analysis, the court applied five of the six
factors of the Biakanja balancing test, 105 while adding a different
sixth factor: whether the imposition of liability would result in an
undue burden on the legal profession. 10 6 Under this balancing
test, the court concluded that the lack of privity did not bar the
plaintiff's tort action. 10 7 Further, the court went beyond Biakanja
and averred that the injured plaintiff, notwithstanding privity,
could also bring an action in contract under an intended benefici-

ary theory. 108
Since the Ultramares and Lucas decisions, the privity doctrine
were drawn from the requirements set out in Glanzer v. Shepard and UltramaresCorp. v.
Touche).
100 Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19. The court indicated that in this case, the balancing
factors weighed in the plaintiffs favor. Id.
101 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
102 Id. at 688.
103 Id. at 686-87.
104 Id. at 686, 688, 692.
105 Id. at 687. The court omitted the moral culpability factor. Id.
106 Id. at 688. The court determined that the original five Biakanja factors favored
the plaintiff. Id. The court further concluded that under the newly-created factor,
the imposition of liability did not place an "undue burden" on the profession, especially in light of the harm that the defendant's alleged negligence caused the innocent plaintiff. Id.
107 Lucas, 364 P.2d at 688.
108 Id. at 689. Chief Justice Gibson stated that:
the main purpose of the testator in making his agreement with the attorney is to benefit the persons named in his will and this intent can be
effectuated, in the event of a breach by the attorney, only by giving the
beneficiaries a right of action, we should recognize, as a matter of policy, that they are entitled to recover as third-party beneficiaries.
Id. Although the court announced that the plaintiff could bring an action either in
tort or in contract against an attorney absent privity, the plaintiffs action failed under
both theories because the plaintiff failed to prove negligence or breach of a contractual duty by the defendant. Id. at 690-91.
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as applied to attorney liability has been severely eroded.1 "9 Most
modern courts have either carved out limited exceptions to the
privity doctrine or have abandoned it altogether.'
In some jurisdictions, however, privity has proven impenetrable and still serves
as an attorney's protective barrier from nonclient suits.1l ' In New
Jersey, however, the question of what duty, if any, an attorney owes
to a nonclient was left unanswered for almost thirty-five years after
the momentous Lucas decision, and although a number of New
Jersey's appellate courts have imposed a duty in various situations,
the question as to the vitality of the privity rule still lingered." 2
Foreshadowing New Jersey's disposition of attorney liability to
third parties, the NewJersey Supreme Court in H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.
Adler' 13 determined that accountants could no longer avoid malpractice liability by invoking the defense of lack of privity. 114 Wiping away the privity requirement, the court announced that
accountants may be held liable to nonclients for negligent misrepresentation where the accountant either knows or should know
that their work will be distributed by a client for business
purposes.

115

109 See Samet et al., supra note 2, at 10.
110 See supra note 7 (discussing the rhost prominent theories courts have employed
to allow a third-party plaintiff to recover from attorneys, irrespective of privity).
111 See Samet et al., supra note 2, at 11 (noting that the privity requirement remains
as a significant defense to third-party liability in New York); see, e.g, Associated Factors
Corp. v. Paul M. O'Neill Detective Agency, Inc., 537 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (holding that a plaintiff who allegedly relied on attorney's opinion letter could
not recover damages because absent fraud, collusion, or other related acts, an attorney is not liable for professional negligence in the absence of privity); Manen v.
Amodeo, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304-05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (explicitly rejecting California's balancing test and maintaining the strict privity requirement in attorney negligence cases).
Only under special circumstances have New York courts strayed from the strict
privity requirement. Samet et al., supra note 2, at 11; see Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992) (holding
that an attorney may be held liable to a nonclient when the parties' relationship is "so
close as to approach that of privity"); Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 396
N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding that where an attorney volunteers to
perform legal services for a third party, he or she assumes a duty of care).
112 See Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 479, 655 A.2d 1354, 1357 (1995) (noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court had not previously examined attorney liability
and the concept of privity but that several appellate division cases had rendered prior
decisions). For discussion of NewJersey appellate court cases addressing the concept
of privity as applied to attorneys, see infra note 123.
113 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
114 Id. at 353, 461 A.2d at 153.
115 Id. at 339, 461 A.2d at 145. The plaintiffs in Rosenblum brought an action against
Touche Ross & Co. (Touche) for damages caused by the firm's alleged negligent
audits of Giant Stores Corporation (Giant). Id. at 328, 461 A.2d at 140. The plaintiffs
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Finally, in Petrillo v. Bachenberg,1 16 the New Jersey Supreme
Court had the opportunity to consider the privity rule's present
viability as applied to attorneys.1 17 Initially, the Court recognized
that a claim for economic loss caused by an attorney's negligence,
once limited by the doctrine of privity, had recently been replaced
by various broader doctrines." i Based primarily on an exhaustive
survey of cases that have either abandoned or weakened the concept of privity, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that the
privity doctrine gave lawyers an unfair, immutable protection
against professional negligence and malpractice claims.1 1 9 Conseprivity with the general tort standard of
quently, the court replaced
1 20
reasonable foreseeability
Beginning the court's privity analysis, Justice Pollock noted
that the question of whether a lawyer owes a duty to a third-party
nonclient can only be answered by balancing the lawyer's obligation to represent his or her client vigorously against the responsibility to accurately represent information upon which a nonclient
may foreseeably rely. 12 1 Next, Justice Pollock pointed out that the
claimed that, in reliance on Touche's audit, they purchased Giant common stock,
which was worthless. Id. The plaintiffs claimed that the accounting firm was liable for
their financial loss, arguing that the firm's negligent audit was the proximate cause of
the harm suffered. Id. The court ruled that the defendants should have known that
the audits would be relied on by the third parties. Id. at 355-56, 461 A.2d at 155. For
further discussion of Rosenblum and Senate Bill No. 826, which effectively overruled
Rosenblum, see infra note 131.
116 139 N.J. 472, 655 A.2d 1354 (1995).
117 Id. at 474, 655 A.2d at 1355. Specifically, the court addressed the issue of
whether under the facts presented, an attorney for the seller of a piece of real estate
owed a duty to the potential buyer. Id.
118 Id. at 479, 655 A.2d at 1357. The court cited the Biakanja court's balancing of
factors test as an example of a doctrine that replaced the privity rule. Id.
119 Id. at 479-85, 489, 655 A.2d at 1357-60, 1362. Before beginning the court's examination of the privity doctrine,Justice Pollock explained that whether a duty exists
is a matter of law to be determined by the court. Id. at 479, 655 A.2d at 1357.
120 Id. at 483-84, 655 A.2d at 1359-60.
121 Id. at 479, 655 A.2d at 1357; see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAwYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT §§ 1.1:203-1, 2.3:102 (Supp. 1994) (discussing a lawyer's duty to nonclients). The Petrillocourt relied in part on Rules 1.3 and 4.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 479, 655 A.2d at 1357. Rule 1.3 states "[a] lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1995); cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrY Canon 7 (1995) (stating that "[t]he duty of a lawyer, both to his client
and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law") (footnotes omitted).
Rule 4.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
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New Jersey Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of what, if
any, duty an attorney owes a nonclient 1 2 2 Thejustice continued by
providing an extensive survey of a number of decisions, including
several rendered by the New Jersey Appellate Division, that have
123
recognized such a duty in specific situations.
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by rule 1.6.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1995).

The comment accompany-

ing Rule 4.1 states:
A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's
behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing
party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer
knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 cmt. 1 (1995). The majority also

referred to section 73, comment b, of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers. Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 479, 655 A.2d at 1357. That comment explains the rationale behind the section regarding an attorney's duty to nonclients and specifically
states that:
Lawyers regularly act in disputes and transactions involving non-clients
who will foreseeably be harmed by inappropriate acts of the lawyers. It
is sometimes appropriate to hold lawyers liable for such harm. Yet it is
often difficult to distinguish between harm resulting from inappropriate lawyer conduct on the one hand and, on the other hand, detriment
to a non-client resulting from a lawyer's fulfilling the proper function of
helping a client through lawful means. Making lawyers liable to nonclients, moreover, could tend to discourage lawyers from vigorous representation. Hence, a duty of care to non-clients arises only in the limited circumstances described in the Section and must be applied in light
of those conflicting concerns.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GovERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. b (Tentative Draft
No. 7, 1994).
122 Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 479, 655 A.2d at 1357.
123 Id. at 479-83, 655 A.2d at 1357-60. The court first examined various appellate
division decisions that have held an attorney liable to a third party. Id. at 479-80, 655
A.2d 1357-58. The first such case, Stewart v. Sbarro involved a suit instituted by the
sellers of stock against the buyers' attorney. Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J. Super. 581,
586-87, 362 A.2d 581, 584-85 (App. Div.), certif[ denied, 72 N.J. 549, 371 A.2d 63 (1976).
In Sbarro, the attorney for the buyers had agreed to get the buyers' signatures on
a mortgage and bond indemnifying the sellers against liability for the existing corporate debt. Id. The attorney failed to obtain the signatures and, as a result, the debt
was left unsecured. Id. Subsequently, the buyers filed for bankruptcy and the sellers
sued the buyers' attorney, among others, for the outstanding debt. Id. While acknowledging that a lawyer generally is not liable to third parties, the court, in a per
curiam opinion, asserted that where an attorney assumes a fiduciary obligation to a
nonclient, the attorney can be held liable for negligence in performing his professional duties. Id at 584, 593-94, 362 A.2d at 583, 588-89.
The Sbarro court adopted the Biakanja balancing of factors test and determined
that the attorney's duty extended to the plaintiffs, despite the absence of privity between the parties, because the attorney should have foreseen the sellers' reliance on
his promise to act. Id. at 593, 362 A.2d at 588 (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16,
19 (Cal. 1958)). For a discussion of the balancing of factors test, see supra notes 99100 and accompanying text.
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The Petrillo court also discussed the analogous decision of Albright v. Burns. Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 480, 655 A.2d at 1357-58 (citing Albright v. Burns, 206 N.J. Super.
625, 503 A.2d 386 (App. Div. 1986)). In Albright, the appellate division maintained
that "a member of the bar owes a fiduciary duty to persons, though not strictly clients,
who he knows or should know rely on him in his professional capacity." Albright, 206
N.J. Super. at 632-33, 503 A.2d at 389. The court further proffered that the determination of whether a duty of an attorney extends to a nonclient third-party "involves
the balance of various factors." Id. at 633, 503 A.2d at 390 (citing Biakanja v. Irving,
320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958)). The court concluded that an attorney who knowingly
facilitated improper transactions regarding the holder of a decedent's power of attorney is liable to the decedent's estate, as he had reason to foresee the harmful repercussions of his negligence. Id., 503 A.2d at 389.
Lastly, the Petrillocourt noted the more recent decision of RJ.Longo Constr. Co. v.
Schragger, which involved township attorneys who had prepared bid documents for a
sewer-construction contract. Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 480, 655 A.2d at 1358 (citing R.J.
Longo Constr. Co. v. Schragger, 218 N.J. Super 206, 527 A.2d 480 (App. Div 1987)).
In RJ. Longo, the defendant attorneys failed to obtain easements referred to in
the construction bid package and, as a direct result, R.J. Longo, the successful bidder,
was barred from continuing work. RJ. Longo Constr. Co. v. Schragger, 218 N.J.
Super. 206, 207-08, 527 A.2d 480, 480 (App. Div 1987). Consequently, R.J. Longo
sued the township attorneys for the financial losses it incurred. Id. at 208, 527 A.2d at
480-81. The RJ. Longo court held that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the
defendant's employment contracts with the township, and as such, the attorney owed
R.J. Longo a fiduciary duty. Id. at 210, 527 A.2d at 482. Therefore, the defendant
attorneys, as asserted by the court, were liable to the contractor for their negligent
misrepresentations upon which the plaintiff foreseeably relied. Id. at 209-10, 527 A.2d
at 481-82.
The Petrillo court next engaged in an analysis of numerous decision from other
jurisdictions regarding attorney liability to third parties. Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 480-82,
655 A.2d at 1358-59. Specifically, the court delved into a detailed discussion of Greycas, Inc. v. Proud and PrudentialIns. Co. of Am. v. Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer &
Wood. Id.
In Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, a finance company sued an attorney for his alleged negligent misrepresentation of a borrower's collateral. Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d
1560, 1561 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988). Greycas, the finance
company, had agreed to lend funds to a borrower, so long as an attorney's opinion
letter, attesting that the borrower's collateral was free from all liens, was provided. Id.
at 1561-62. The attorney defendant prepared the requested letter without conducting
a search for prior liens and based his opinion solely on the borrower's representations. Id. at 1562. After the letter was submitted to the lender and the funds were
issued, the borrower defaulted and Greycas learned that the loan was unsecured because the collateral was subject to superior liens. Id. Ultimately, the circuit court
decided that under Illinois law, even in the absence of privity, the attorney owed the
lender a duty to accurately represent the borrower's financial status. Id. at 1565.
Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals in Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey
Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, which involved a suit by a lender against a borrower's attorney for his negligent preparation of an opinion letter, held that an attorney may owe a duty to nonclients who foreseeably rely on an attorney's
representations. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer &
Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992). The court elaborated that an attorney may
be held liable for negligent misrepresentation to a nonclient when the parties' relationship is "so close as to approach that of privity." Id. Next, the court stated the
critical criteria that determines whether a duty is owed:
(1) an awareness by the maker of the statement that it is to be used for a
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Justice Pollock observed that when courts have made exceptions to the traditional privity requirement, they usually limit a lawyer's duty to situations in which an attorney either intended or
should have anticipated that a third-party nonclient would rely on
his or her work. 124 The majority explained that an attorney should
foresee that a legal opinion letter may be relied upon by nonclients
125
because such a letter's primary purpose is to induce reliance.
Continuing, the court commented that in various other contexts, courts have imposed duties on attorneys who provided instruments, such as a title search or a private offering statement for a
client's corporate debentures, with the intention of inducing the
reliance of a third party. 12 6 Next, the court pointed out that secparticular purpose; (2) reliance by a known party on the statement in
furtherance of that purpose; and (3) some conduct by the maker of the
statement linking it to the relying party and evincing its understanding
of that reliance.
Id. at 321-22 (citing Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110,
118 (N.Y. 1985) (discussing accountant's liability to third parties)). Based on the
cited criteria, the Prudentialcourt concluded that the attorney owed a duty of care to
the third-party plaintiff. Id. at 323.
124 Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 482, 655 A.2d at 1359.
125 Id. (citing Norman v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 693 F. Supp. 1259, 1265 (D.
Mass. 1988) (stating that a tax opinion letter is usually drafted so that someone may
rely upon it)). The Petrillo court stressed that a duty only extends to a third party if
the defendant actually does foresee or should have foreseen reliance. Id.
126 Id. at 483, 655 A.2d at 1359. The court offered Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine
and Century 21 Deep S. Prop., Ltd. v. Corson as examples. Id. In Molecular Tech. Corp. v.
Valentine, involving the negligent preparation of a private offering statement by an
attorney for his client's corporate debentures, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that under Michigan law an attorney has a duty to all third persons whom the
attorney either knows or should reasonably foresee will rely on information provided.
Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 913, 916 (6th Cir. 1991). But see In
reRospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239, 1261 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (refusing to extend
an attorney's liability for negligent misrepresentation to include negligence in the
stock offering of a giant, publicly traded corporate stock); Friedman v. Dozorc, 312
N.W.2d 585, 594 (Mich. 1981) (declining to address the issue of whether an attorney,
who is not the plaintiffs adversary in litigation, may be found negligent to third
parties).
Several commentators have written specifically on the law of negligent misrepresentation in Michigan. See generally Gerald W. Boston, Liability of Attorneys to Nonclients
in Michigan: A Re-examination of Friedman v. Dozorc and a Rule of Limited Liability, 68
U. DET. L. REv. 307 (1991); Mary Elizabeth Phelan, Unleashing the Limits on Lauyers
Liability? Mieras v. DeBona: MichiganJoins the Mainstream and Abrogates the Privity Requirement in Attorney-MalpracticeCases Involving Negligent Will Drafting,72 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 327 (1995).
In Century 21 Deep S. Prop., Ltd. v. Corson, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that
an attorney for the seller of real property who negligently performed title work on
which the buyer relied could be sued for negligence, notwithstanding the absence of
privity. Century 21 Deep S. Prop., Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 374 (Miss. 1992).
Specifically, the Century 21 court proffered, "[ t ] oday we modify the requirements
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tion 73 of the proposed Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers provides that a lawyer owes a duty to a nonclient when the
lawyer's legal opinion, or other related service, invites a nonclient's
12 7
reliance.
At this juncture, the majority announced its affirmation of the
notion that an attorney owes a duty to some nonclients 1 2 8 The
court stated that where the attorney either knows or has reason to
know that a nonclient will rely on the attorney's representations
and the nonclient is not 29too remote to be entitled protection, a
fiduciary duty may exist.'
Taking a defensive stance, Justice Pollock noted that the imposition of liability on attorneys to third parties accords with principles of tort law."' Further defending the court's position, the
of legal malpractice actions based on an attorney's negligence in performing title
work by abolishing the requirement of attorney-client relationship and extending liability to foreseeable third parties who detrimentally rely, as we have done in cases
involving other professions." Id. But see Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 401 N.W.2d
816, 826-27 (Wis. 1987) (holding that an attorney for the seller of a parcel of real
property could not be held liable to the buyer for negligent misrepresentation because, except for will drafting cases, Wisconsin law only allows recovery by a nonclient
for fraudulent misrepresentation).
127 Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 483-84, 655 A.2d at 1359-60. Section 73 of the Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, in pertinent part, provides:
For the purposes of liability under § 71, a lawyer owes a duty to use care
within the meaning of § 74:
(1) To a prospective client, as stated in § 27;
(2) To a non-client when and to the extent that the lawyer or (with the
lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites the non-client to
rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal services, the
non-client so relies, and the non-client is not, under applicable law,
too remote from the lawyer to be entitled to protection;
(3) To a non-client when and to the extent that the lawyer knows that a
client intends the lawyer's services to benefit the non-client, and
such a duty substantially promotes enforcement of the lawyer's obligations to the client and would not create inconsistent duties significantly impairing the lawyer's performance of those obligations ....
RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS, § 73 (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1994).
128 Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 483-84, 655 A.2d at 1359-60. Specifically, the supreme court
maintained that a lawyer may owe a duty when the lawyer either knows or should have
reason to know that nonclients will rely on the lawyer's representations; the nonclients, however, must not be too remote to be entitled to protection. Id. The court
asserted that its requirement that the attorney must either know or should know of
the nonclient's reliance is in accord with the requirement in the Restatement (Third)
of Law Governing Lawyers that the attorney invite or assent in the nonclient's reliance. Id. at 484, 655 A.2d at 1360. The majority further commented that "[n]o matter how expressed, the point is to cabin the lawyer's duty, so that the resulting
obligation is fair to both lawyers and the public." Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. Buttressing this assertion, Justice Pollock argued that section 552 of the Re-
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majority emphasized that it had previously determined that a certified public accountant could be held liable for negligence to shareholders, absent privity, whose reliance on financial statements in
131
acquiring stock through a merger was foreseeable.
Having delineated the circumstances under which an attorney
statement (Second) of Torts comports with the court's holding. Id. Section 552 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, tiled "Information Negligently Supplied for the
Guidance of Others," provides:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to
them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection
(1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends
or in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give information
extends to the loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose
benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is
intended to protect them.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
131 Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 484, 655 A.2d at 1360 (citing H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93
N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983)). The court noted that in Rosenblun, it tempered its
holding, stating that:
[the investors] would have to establish that they received the audited
statements from the company pursuant to a proper company purpose,
that they, in accordance with that purpose, relied on the statements and
that the misstatements therein were due to the auditor's negligence and
were the proximate cause of the [investor's] damage.
Id. (quoting H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 350, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (1983)).
The Petrillocourt continued by recognizing that although New Jersey Senate Bill No.
826, which was signed into law on March 17,1995 by Governor Christine Todd Whitman, effectively overrules Rosenblum it has no affect on attorneys and other professionals. Id. at 485, 655 A.2d at 1360. Senate Bill No. 826 reads, in pertinent part:
b. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, no accountant shall
be liable for damages for negligence arising out of and in the course
of rendering any professional accounting service unless:
(1) The plaintiff instituting the action against the accountant was
the accountant's client; or
(2) The accountant:
(a) knew at the time of the engagement, or agreed with the client after
the time of the engagement, that the professional accounting service rendered to the client would be made available to the plaintiff,
who was specifically identified to the accountant in connection with
a specified transaction made by the plaintiff;
(b) was aware that the plaintiff intended to rely upon the professional
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may be liable to a nonclient, the court applied its holding to the
case at bar.1 1 2 Initially, the court explained that the objective purpose of opinion letters and the like, coupled with the degree to
which another may foreseeably rely on them, dictates the extent to
which a lawyer's duty extends in preparing such documents.13 3
accounting service in connection with that specified transaction;
and
(c) directly expressed to the plaintiff, by words or conduct, the accountant's understanding of the plaintiffs reliance on the professional
accounting service.
S. 826, 206th Leg., 1st Sess. (1994) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-25 (1995)).
The statement presented before the Senate endorsing the bill states:
This bill would limit accountants' liability to third parties for the
accountants' negligent acts. Although accountants' civil liability has historically been limited by common law, which required that there must
be privity (a direct relationship) between an accountant and any party
bringing suit against him, recent case law has weakened this concept.
In H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324 (1983), the New Jersey
Supreme Court expanded the scope of accountants' liability to include
all "reasonably foreseeable" plaintiffs, such as stockholders and potential investors.
Thus, an accountant providing professional services to a client is
vulnerable to lawsuits by virtually any member of the investing public at
large, regardless of whether the accountant had any previous relationship with that person or any knowledge that the person would rely on
the services the accountant rendered.
The sponsor believes that this situation is particularly unjust in light
of the fact that an accountant is rarely the primary wrongdoer in negligence cases. Instead, the accountant is sued because he failed to detect
the fraud of his client. In many cases, an accounting firm is sued because it has "deep pockets," in contrast to its client, which may have
become insolvent by the time the investors realize they have been
defrauded.
Id. But see No Immunity for Lawyers, N.J.L.J., June 19, 1995, at 24 (opining that the bill
was wrongly enacted and arguing against broadening Bill 826 to include immunity for
other professions).
The Petrillocourt further noted that the appellate division had already extended
the Rosenblum decision to lawyers in Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp. Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 485,
655 A.2d at 1360. Zendell involved a suit against a law firm which had improperly
arranged the sale of partnership interests. Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp., 226 N.J.
Super. 431, 438, 544 A.2d 878, 881 (App. Div. 1988). Specifically, the attorneys organized and sold unregistered limited partnership interests and, upon failure of the partnership, the plaintiffs sued, alleging attorney negligence for allowing unregistered
securities to be offered and sold. Id. at 439, 544 A.2d at 881-82. Reversing the trial
court's ruling for summary judgment in favor of the defendant attorney, the appellate
division sustained that "the plaintiff negligence claim .... is cognizable under Rosenblum" Id.
132 Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 486-88, 655 A.2d at 1361-62.
133 Id. at 485, 655 A.2d at 1361. The court, while acknowledging that Herrigel did
not issue an opinion letter, viewed the composite report as a comparable document.
Id. at 486, 655 A.2d at 1361. Specifically, the court stated that "[h]ere, Herrigel did
not prepare an opinion letter. Giving Petrillo the benefit of all reasonable inferences,
however, we infer that Herrigel extracted information from existing percolation test
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Next, Justice Pollock observed that a court must first discern
134
the objective purpose of an opinion letter or similar document.
In making this assessment, the court ruled that when Herrigel
transferred the report to Bachenberg, he knew or at least should
have known that it would eventually wind up in the hands of a prospective purchaser. 135 Based upon Herrigel's continued involvement in the transaction, the court further concluded that the
objective purpose of the composite report was to encourage a prospective buyer to purchase the property.1 3 6 Moreover, proclaimed
the court, a reasonable person reading the report would likely conclude that two out of seven tests were successful and could decide
to purchase the property based on that conclusion. 3 7 Consequently, the court posited that a reasonable jury could conclude
that the report misrepresented material facts.13 8 Based on these
deductions, the court held that Herrigel's duty as an attorney ex39
tended to Petrillo.1
reports, created the composite report, and delivered the report to a real estate broker." Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. The court articulated that although Herrigel's subjective intent may have
been to demonstrate that two percolation tests had been successful, objectively the
report had a different purpose. Id. Justice Pollock admitted that in making its assessment, the court could not ignore the relationship of the parties. Id. Specifically, as
emphasized by the court, "Herrigel is an attorney who, in connection with his client's
efforts to sell the property, provided the report to a real estate broker." Id. Finally,
the majority pointed out that Herrigel did nothing to protect himself by limiting a
third party's foreseeable use of the report. Id. The majority commented that Herrigel could have indicated either in the report, a cover letter, or a disclaimer that the
report was not accurate. Id.
136 Id. Justice Pollock, in support of the court's conclusion, explained that Herrigel
acted as Bachenberg's lawyer in negotiating the terms of the contract with Petrillo,
and that although assembling an engineering report "may not be a part of a lawyer's
stock-in-trade," representing a seller of commercial real estate is within the scope of
representation. Id. Based on Herrigel's involvement in the transaction, the majority
also inferred that Herrigel was aware that Bachenberg intended to use the report to
induce a prospective buyer to purchase the property. Id. at 486-87, 655 A.2d at 1361.
137 Petri//o, 139 N.J. at 487, 655 A.2d at 1361.
138 Id.
139 Id. The court maintained that because Herrigel transferred the results of the
tests to Bachenberg and thereafter represented him in the sale of the land, Herrigel
assumed a duty to provide reliable information to Petrillo. Id. The court buttressed
its holding by noting, once again, that Herrigel had plenty of opportunities to control
a third party's reliance on the report. Id. The court posited that Herrigel could have
controlled his liability either by providing Bachenberg with a letter stating that the
commercial property had passed two percolation tests as required or he could have
expressly stated in either a letter or the report itself that the report should not be
relied upon other than as evidence that the property had passed two tests. Id., 655
A.2d at 1361-62. As a result, the court concluded that fairness mandated that he bear
the risk of loss created by his delivery of the misleading report. Id., 655 A.2d at 1361.
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Addressing the dissent's contentions, Justice Pollock first
maintained that a jury could reasonably find that Herrigel should
have foreseen that Bachenberg, notwithstanding the change from
agent to seller,14° would provide the composite report to prospective buyers.1 4 ' The justice averred that the dissent could reach a
contrary conclusion only if Herrigel's and Bachenberg's continuous involvement were ignored.14 2 Second, based on the size of the
class of report recipients, the court attested that Herrigel would
not be exposed to an indeterminate risk of liability.1 43 Third, the
majority determined that Petrillo was not a remote third-party
plaintiff and, as such, Herrigel should have foreseen the harm he
might inflict upon a prospective purchaser. 144 Finally, the court
refuted the dissent's policy arguments, insisting that the extension
of a duty would not place a costly burden on the legal system;
rather, such a duty will shield innocent third persons from negli145
gent misrepresentations by attorneys.
Concluding, Justice Pollock clarified that the court's holding
simply created an attorney obligation to avoid negligently misrepresenting material documents on which the attorney either knows
or should know others will rely.' 46 Accordingly, the court insisted
that lawyers will not be held as guarantors of the accuracy of tests
1 47
or other comparable expert reports that they merely transmit.
As noted by the court, lawyers may not always have an obligation to
act; however, when they act, they must do so carefully.14
Justice Stein filed a brief concurrence, opining that the majority's holding would have no material effect on lawyers' or other
professionals' liability to third parties. 4 9 The concurrence asThe court further explained that because Herrigel was fully aware of Petrillo's
concerns, he had a duty to disclose information about both unsuccessful and successful tests. Id. at 488, 655 A.2d at 1362. Finally, the court stressed that its decision to
reverse the judgment of dismissal does not mean that Herrigel would not be found
free from all liability upon remand. Id. Justice Pollock explained that ajury could
rule in Herrigel's favor if they were to find, for example, that Petrillo was only concerned with the fact that the property had successfully passed two percolation tests or
if they found that the report was neither misleading nor material. Id.
140 Id. The court determined that Bachenberg intended to sell the land. Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 PetriUo, 139 N.J. at 488-89, 655 A.2d at 1362.
144 Id. at 489, 655 A.2d at 1362.
145 Id. The majority asserted that extending a duty from Herrigel to Petrillo will
not make lawyers more defensive, more costly, or less accessible. Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. (Stein, J., concurring).
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serted that due to the unusual circumstances under which the case
at bar arose, the court's decision would have a minimal impact beyond these specific facts.15 ° The justice chided the catastrophic
consequences anticipated by the dissent, stating that Justice Garibaldi simply ignored the extraordinary factual underpinnings of
the case and consequently greatly overstated the majority decision's effect.1 51
In a brusque dissent, however, Justice Garibaldi upbraided the
majority for imposing a broader duty on attorneys than that provided by the Restatement of Torts, the proposed Restatement of
Law Governing Lawyers, and New Jersey case law. 152 Such an extension, argued Justice Garibaldi, will make legal services more
costly, more cumbersome, and less available to clients, and will also
15
encourage defensive lawyering. 3

Justice Garibaldi asserted that the majority's holding imposes
on attorneys an overbroad indeterminate duty of care to nonclients.15 ' First, Justice Garibaldi distinguished the case at bar from
the proposed Restatement (Second) of the Law Governing Lawyers. 55 Second, the justice maintained that under Rosenblum,15 6
150 Id. at 489, 490, 655 A.2d at 1363 (Stein, J., concurring). Justice Stein stressed
the court's conclusion that "by providing the composite report to Bachenberg and
subsequently representing him in the sale, Herrigel assumed a duty to Petrillo to provide reliable information regarding the percolation tests." Id. at 490, 655 A.2d at 1363
(Stein, J., concurring) (quoting Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 487, 655 A.2d at 1361).
151 Id. at 489-90, 655 A.2d at 1363 (Stein, J., concurring).
152 Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 490, 655 A.2d at 1363 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
153 Id. Justice Garibaldi stressed that section 73, comments b and c, of the proposed Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers narrowly defines the circumstances
in which a lawyer may owe a duty to a nonclient. Id. at 491, 655 A.2d at 1363 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi quoted with approval from the Restatement,
specifically noting that:
[m] aking lawyers liable to non-clients, moreover, could tend to discourage lawyers from vigorous representation. Hence, a duty of care to nonclients arises only in the limited circumstances described in this Section
and must be applied in light of those conflicting concerns.

Similarly, a lawyer representing a client in an arm's-length business
transaction does not owe a duty of care to opposing non-clients, except
in the exceptional circumstances described in this Section.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOvERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmts. b & c
(Tentative Draft No. 7, 1994)).
154 Id. at 494, 655 A.2d at 1365. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
155 Id. After a brief recitation of the facts, Justice Garibaldi averred that Herrigel
should not be held liable to Petrillo under the proposed Restatement because this
case did not involve the transmission of a legal opinion, performance of a legal service
or the undertaking of a specific legal task. Id.
156 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing Rosenblum).
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Herrigel did not owe a duty to Petrillo.15 7 The justice posited that
under Rosenblum, Herrigel could not be held liable unless Petrillo
had received the report "from and for the benefit of Rohrer."1 5
Likewise, proclaimed the justice, Petrillo was too remote from Herrigel to recover.1 5 9 Third, the dissent articulated that under the
"balancing of factors" test, Herrigel could not be held liable because: (1) he never intended to affect Petrillo; (2) there was not a
close nexus between Herrigel's actions and Petrillo's alleged injuries; and (3) no moral blame attaches to the inaccurate collating of
a report.16 ° Finally, the dissent pointed out that Petrillo testified
that she never intended to rely on the composite report and, in
fact, did not rely on the report. 161 Based on the foregoing, Justice
162
Garibaldi concluded that Herrigel did not owe a duty to Petrillo.
In light of the breakdown of the privity doctrine, the Petrillo
court aptly recognized that an attorney can no longer be completely immune from third-party liability. The majority's decision,
however, broadens the scope of attorneys' liability farther than required. 6 5 As astutely noted by the dissent, the court's decision is
broader than the provisions in the Restatement of Torts, the proposed Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers, and NewJersey case
law. Furthermore, by adopting a foreseeability test, lawyers practicing in NewJersey are now saddled with a greater obligation to non164
clients than nearly any other jurisdiction in the country.
Petrillo, 139 N.J. at 494-95, 655 A.2d at 1365 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id. at 495, 655 A.2d at 1365. (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
Id. The justice asserted that as "Rosenblum makes clear, a remote party is not
entitled to recover from an attorney who could not have foreseen the harm to the
non-client. Even if Petrillo had relied on the report, her reliance in that later transaction with a different owner makes her too remote for Herrigel to have foreseen harm
to her." Id.
160 Id. at 495-96, 655 A.2d at 1366 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 497, 655 A.2d at 1366 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Justice Garibaldi explained that a nonclient must prove that he or she detrimentally relied on an attorney's negligent conduct in order to recover damages for negligent misrepresentation.
Id. at 496-97, 655 A.2d at 1366 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out,
however, that Petrillo consistently testified that she did not rely on the report and that
she never intended to do so. Id. at 497, 655 A.2d at 1366 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
162 Id., 655 A.2d at 1367 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
163 See Kerrie Restieri-Heslin, Note, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 2227, 2255 n.121 (1994)
(noting the New Jersey Supreme Court's recognition for both its pro-plaintiff and
revolutionary stances).
164 See, e.g., Mehaffy, Rider, Windholz & Wilson v. Central Bank of Denver, NA.,
892 P.2d 230, 240 (Colo. 1995) (determining that attorney malpractice claims are
limited by the privity doctrine); Donahue v. Shugart, Thomson & Kilroy, 900 S.W.2d
624, 628 (Mo. 1995) (applying a modified balancing of factors test to determine
whether a duty was owed to a third-party nonclient); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 605 N.E.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1992) (deter157
158
159
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From the detailed structure of its decision, it is apparent that
the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to create an equitable
rule regarding an attorney's liability to third parties. Although the
court analyzed a number of cases that have expanded attorney liability, only a few courts actually employed a pure foreseeability
test. 165 The majority failed to recognize that most jurisdictions
limit the scope of nonclient plaintiff actions by using the Biakanja
balancing test, or a variation thereof, and/or an intended beneficiary theory to determine liability.1 66 Creating a broad scope of nonclient plaintiffs, the majority's decision is clearly inimical to tort
reform in NewJersey. Its decision will impose an undue burden on
the legal profession and will adversely affect both clients and nonclients alike.
As noted by the dissent, the majority's decision will make legal
services more costly, more cumbersome, and less available to clients, and it will also engender defensive lawyering.16 7 First, a lawyer's primary duty is to zealously represent his or her client's best
interests.1 6 8 Consequently, the majority's foreseeability standard
may lead to problems of conflicting interests. Clearly, an attorney's
duty to a nonclient cannot equal the level of duty owed to the client. Second, the majority's holding may weaken the attorney-client
relationship. For example, an attorney faced with a third-party
malpractice claim may be forced to decide between defending himmining that a third-party nonclient could recover from an attorney because the parties' relationship approached that of privity); Associated Factors Corp. v. Paul M.
O'Neill Detective Agency, Inc., 537 N.Y.S.2d 212 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding
that absent privity, fraud, or collusion, an attorney is not liable for professional negligence); Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983) (applying an intended beneficiary test); Thomas v. Pryor, 847 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tx. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding the
privity rule).
165 See Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 916 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that an attorney owes a duty to a person whom he reasonably foresees or knows
will rely on information); Norman v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 693 F. Supp. 1259,
1265 (D. Mass. 1988) (explaining that lack of privity did not shield defendant attorneys from liability to third parties because they knew that a securities offering circular
would contain their opinion letter and, therefore, must have foreseen potential investors' reliance); Century 21 Deep S. Prop. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 374 (Miss. 1992)
(abolishing the privity requirement for legal malpractice claims and "extending liability to foreseeable third parties who detrimentally rely [on negligent legal opinions]").
166 See supra note 7 (discussing cases that have extended attorney liability under the
Biakanja balancing of factors test and under an intended beneficiary theory).
167 See Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.J. 472, 490, 655 A.2d 1354, 1363 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
168 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (stating that "[a]
lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf").
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self and protecting his client's confidence.1 69 Third, it is unlikely
that the court's foreseeability standard will improve the quality of
lawyering. Rather, lawyers will likely look to malpractice insurers to
cover the increased risk of liability. Any increased insurance payments will simply be borne by the clients through higher fees. 7 °
Fourth, in an attempt to avoid liability and higher insurance premiums, attorneys will likely draft more equivocal opinion letters and
similar documents, containing excess caveats, exceptions, and/or
1 72
disclaimers. 17 1 Ironically, third parties may ultimately suffer.
Expanding liability to such a large range of nonclients is not
the proper remedy for negligent lawyering. Although negligent
lawyering needs to be thwarted, the court could have adopted a
more equitable rule of law. The Lucas version of the Biakanjabalancing test, for example, protects the harmed nonclient while also
assuring that the imposition of liability will not unduly burden the
legal profession. Accordingly, Justice Garibaldi accurately recognized the harmful repercussions of the majority's holding.
Jennifer R. Rossi

169 See Samet et al., supra note 2, at 40 (describing the tension between the fear of
nonclient liability and ethical standards owed to a client).
170 See Cifu, supra note 4, at 23 (discussing the insurance implications of expanding
attorney liability).
171 See id. at 24 (noting that a third party's interest would be best served by obtaining a lawyer concerned solely with his or her interest, rather than relying on an
adverse party's attorney).
172 Id.

